caa a22 4500 388057637 CHVBK 20180307125111.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199803 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S1358246100004331 doi S1358246100004331 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S1358246100004331 Campbell John Joint Attention and the First Person [Elektronische Daten] [John Campbell] It is sometimes said that ordinary linguistic exchange, in ordinary conversation, is a matter of securing and sustaining joint attention. The minimal condition for the success of the conversation is that the participants should be attending to the same things. So the psychologist Michael Tomasello writes, ‘I take it as axiomatic that when humans use language to communicate referentially they are attempting to manipulate the attention of another person or persons.' I think that this is an extremely fertile approach to philosophical problems about meaning and reference, and in this paper I want to apply it to the case of the first person. So I want to look at the case in which you tell me something about yourself, using the first person, and we achieve joint attention to the same object. But I begin with some remarks about how this approach applies to proper names and to perceptual demonstratives. Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1998 Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement Cambridge University Press 43(1998-03), 123-136 1358-2461 43<123 1998 43 PHS https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246100004331 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246100004331 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Campbell John NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement Cambridge University Press 43(1998-03), 123-136 1358-2461 43<123 1998 43 PHS CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge