caa a22 4500 388057653 CHVBK 20180307125111.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199803 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S1358246100004343 doi S1358246100004343 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S1358246100004343 Honderich Ted Consciousness as Existence [Elektronische Daten] [Ted Honderich] The difference for present purposes between ourselves and stones, chairs and our computers is that we are conscious. The difference is fundamental. Being conscious is sufficient for having a mind in one sense of the word ‘mind', and being conscious is necessary and fundamental to having a mind in any decent sense. What is this difference between ourselves and stones, chairs and our computers? The question is not meant to imply that there is a conceptual or a nomic barrier in the way of non-biological things being conscious. It may happen one decade that the other minds problem will shoot up the philosophical agenda and get a lot of attention as a result of a wonderful computer attached to perceptual and behavioural mechanisms, and that the thing will in the end be taken as conscious, rightly. Our question is not what things can be conscious, but what the Property or nature of consciousness is. Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1998 Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement Cambridge University Press 43(1998-03), 137-155 1358-2461 43<137 1998 43 PHS https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246100004343 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246100004343 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Honderich Ted NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement Cambridge University Press 43(1998-03), 137-155 1358-2461 43<137 1998 43 PHS CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge