caa a22 4500 38805767X CHVBK 20180307125111.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199803 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S1358246100004380 doi S1358246100004380 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S1358246100004380 Crane Tim Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental [Elektronische Daten] [Tim Crane] ‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional' said Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘and a consciousness that ceases to be a consciousness of something would ipso facto cease to exist.' Sartre here endorses the central doctrine of Husserl's phenomenology, itself inspired by a famous idea of Brentano's: that intentionality, the mind's ‘direction upon its objects', is what is distinctive of mental phenomena. Brentano's originality does not lie in pointing out the existence of intentionality, or in inventing the terminology, which derives from scholastic discussions of concepts or intentiones. Rather, his originality consists in his claim that the concept of intentionality marks out the subject matter of psychology: the mental. His view was that intentionality ‘is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon manifests anything like it.' This is Brentano's thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental. Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1998 Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement Cambridge University Press 43(1998-03), 229-251 1358-2461 43<229 1998 43 PHS https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246100004380 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246100004380 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Crane Tim NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement Cambridge University Press 43(1998-03), 229-251 1358-2461 43<229 1998 43 PHS CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge