caa a22 4500 388057696 CHVBK 20180307125111.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199803 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S135824610000432X doi S135824610000432X pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S135824610000432X Wright Crispin Self-knowledge: the Wittgensteinian Legacy [Elektronische Daten] [Crispin Wright] It is only in fairly recent philosophy that psychological self-knowledge has come to be seen as problematical; once upon a time the hardest philosophical difficulties all seemed to attend our knowledge of others. But as philosophers have canvassed various models of the mental that would make knowledge of other minds less intractable, so it has become unobvious how to accommodate what once seemed evident and straightforward-the wide and seemingly immediate cognitive dominion of minds over themselves. Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1998 Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement Cambridge University Press 43(1998-03), 101-122 1358-2461 43<101 1998 43 PHS https://doi.org/10.1017/S135824610000432X text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S135824610000432X text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Wright Crispin NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement Cambridge University Press 43(1998-03), 101-122 1358-2461 43<101 1998 43 PHS CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge