caa a22 4500 38805770X CHVBK 20180307125111.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199803 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S1358246100004367 doi S1358246100004367 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S1358246100004367 Eilan Naomi Perceptual Intentionality. Attention and Consciousness [Elektronische Daten] [Naomi Eilan] A representative expression of current thinking on the ‘problem of consciousness' runs as follows. There is one, impenetrably hard problem; and a host of soluble, and in this sense easy problems. The hard problem is: how could a physical system yield subjective states? How could there be something it is like to be a physical system? This problem corresponds to a concept of consciousness invariably labelled ‘phenomenal consciousness'. It is here, with respect to phenomenal consciousness, that we encounter an ‘explanatory gap', where it is this gap that makes the problem so hard. Nothing we can say about the workings of a physical system could begin to explain the existence and nature of subjective, phenomenal feel. Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1998 Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement Cambridge University Press 43(1998-03), 181-202 1358-2461 43<181 1998 43 PHS https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246100004367 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246100004367 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Eilan Naomi NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement Cambridge University Press 43(1998-03), 181-202 1358-2461 43<181 1998 43 PHS CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge