caa a22 4500 388067217 CHVBK 20180307125136.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199903 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0953820800002284 doi S0953820800002284 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0953820800002284 Carlson Erik Uppsala University, erik.carlson@filosofi.uu.se The Oughts and Cans of Objective Consequentialism [Elektronische Daten] [Erik Carlson] Frances Howard-Snyder has argued that objective consequentialism violates the principle that ‘ought' implies ‘can'. In most situations, she claims, we cannot produce the best consequences available, although objective consequentialism says that we ought to do so. Here I try to show that Howard-Snyder's argument is unsound. The claim that we typically cannot produce the best consequences available is doubtful. And even if there is a sense of ‘producing the best consequences' in which we cannot do so, objective consequentialism does not entail that we ought, in this sense, to produce the best consequences. Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1999 Utilitas Cambridge University Press 11/1(1999-03), 91-96 0953-8208 11:1<91 1999 11 UTI https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800002284 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800002284 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Carlson Erik Uppsala University, erik.carlson@filosofi.uu.se NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Utilitas Cambridge University Press 11/1(1999-03), 91-96 0953-8208 11:1<91 1999 11 UTI CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge