caa a22 4500 388067292 CHVBK 20180307125136.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199903 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0953820800002260 doi S0953820800002260 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0953820800002260 Lippert-Rasmussen Kasper University of Copenhagen, lippert@coco.ihi.ku.dk In What Way are Constraints Paradoxical? [Elektronische Daten] [Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen] It is impermissible to violate a constraint, even if by doing so a greater number of violations of the very same constraint were to be prevented. Most find this puzzling. But what makes the impermissibility of such minimizing violations puzzling? This article discusses some recent answers (by Scheffier, Kamm and Nagel) to this question. The article's first aim is to make clear in what way these answers differ. The second aim is to evaluate the answers, along with Kamm's and Nagel's proposed solutions of what they see as the puzzle of constraints. The main thesis of the article is this: because defenders of constraints are not committed to any conception of valuable states of affairs, constraints do not conflict with maximizing rationality; but neither can they be accounted for in terms of impersonal values. Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1999 Utilitas Cambridge University Press 11/1(1999-03), 49-70 0953-8208 11:1<49 1999 11 UTI https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800002260 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800002260 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Lippert-Rasmussen Kasper University of Copenhagen, lippert@coco.ihi.ku.dk NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Utilitas Cambridge University Press 11/1(1999-03), 49-70 0953-8208 11:1<49 1999 11 UTI CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge