caa a22 4500 388067306 CHVBK 20180307125136.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199903 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0953820800002247 doi S0953820800002247 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0953820800002247 Holtug Nils University of Copenhagen, nhol@coco.ihi.ku.dk Utility, Priority and Possible People [Elektronische Daten] [Nils Holtug] This paper discusses what the so-called Priority View implies regarding possible people. It is argued that this view is plausible when applied to fixed populations, but that, when applied to the issue of possible people, it faces certain difficulties. If it is claimed that possible people fall within the scope of the Priority View, we are led to the repugnant conclusion (and other counter-intuitive conclusions) at a faster pace than we are by, e.g., utilitarianism. And if it is claimed that possible people do not fall within the scope of the Priority View, we shall have to combine this view with a different view in order to avoid certain counter-intuitive judgements. Such a combined view, however, leads to intransitivities. At the end of the paper, I discuss what these conclusions imply regarding both the Priority View and our moral obligations to possible people. Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1999 Utilitas Cambridge University Press 11/1(1999-03), 16-36 0953-8208 11:1<16 1999 11 UTI https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800002247 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800002247 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Holtug Nils University of Copenhagen, nhol@coco.ihi.ku.dk NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Utilitas Cambridge University Press 11/1(1999-03), 16-36 0953-8208 11:1<16 1999 11 UTI CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge