caa a22 4500 388067322 CHVBK 20180307125136.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199903 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0953820800002259 doi S0953820800002259 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0953820800002259 Gaut Berys University of St Andrews, bng@st-andrews.ac.uk Rag-bags, Disputes and Moral Pluralism [Elektronische Daten] [Berys Gaut] Moral pluralism of the kind associated with W. D. Ross is the doctrine that there is a plurality of moral principles, which in their application to particular cases can conflict, and that there is no further principle to determine which of these principles takes priority in cases of conflict. Two objections are commonly advanced against this kind of pluralism: that it proposes a rag-bag of moral principles lacking a unifying basis; and that it offers no way to adjudicate moral disputes when our intuitions about what to do conflict. The present paper replies to both of these objections, in particular by responding to versions of them advanced by Brad Hooker. The tying together and justification of different moral principles may be achieved by a general rational justification procedure, rather than by a further moral principle; and such a rational justification procedure can help to adjudicate moral disputes. Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1999 Utilitas Cambridge University Press 11/1(1999-03), 37-48 0953-8208 11:1<37 1999 11 UTI https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800002259 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800002259 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Gaut Berys University of St Andrews, bng@st-andrews.ac.uk NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Utilitas Cambridge University Press 11/1(1999-03), 37-48 0953-8208 11:1<37 1999 11 UTI CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge