caa a22 4500 388067349 CHVBK 20180307125136.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199903 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0953820800002235 doi S0953820800002235 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0953820800002235 Zimmerman Michael J. University of North Carolina at Greensboro, m_zimme2@hamlet.uncg.edu The Moral Aspect of Nonmoral Goods and Evils [Elektronische Daten] [Michael J. Zimmerman] The idea that immoral behaviour can sometimes be admirable, and that moral behaviour can sometimes be less than admirable, has led several of its supporters to infer that moral considerations are not always overriding, contrary to what has been traditionally maintained. In this paper I shall challenge this inference. My purpose in doing so is to expose and acknowledge something that has been inadequately appreciated, namely, the moral aspect of nonmoral goods and evils. I hope thereby to show that, even if immorality can be admirable (and morality less than admirable), this poses no threat to morality. Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1999 Utilitas Cambridge University Press 11/1(1999-03), 1-15 0953-8208 11:1<1 1999 11 UTI https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800002235 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800002235 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Zimmerman Michael J. University of North Carolina at Greensboro, m_zimme2@hamlet.uncg.edu NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Utilitas Cambridge University Press 11/1(1999-03), 1-15 0953-8208 11:1<1 1999 11 UTI CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge