caa a22 4500 388067365 CHVBK 20180307125137.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199903 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0953820800002272 doi S0953820800002272 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0953820800002272 Zangwill Nick Glasgow University, nza@arts.gla.ac.uk Dilemmas and Moral Realism [Elektronische Daten] [Nick Zangwill] I distinguish two different arguments against cognitivism in Bernard Williams's writings on moral dilemmas. The first turns on there being a truth of the matter about what we ought to do in a moral dilemma. That argument can be met by appealing to our epistemic shortcomings and to pro tanto obligations. However, those responses make no headway with the second argument, which concerns the rationality of the moral regret that we feel in dilemma situations. I show how the rationality of moral regret can be explained on an ‘independent desire' model. And I show how Williams's second argument only appears to have force because of a certain faulty way of conceiving the issue over cognitivism. But Williams's argument rightly alerts us to the rational role of desire in our moral thought. Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1999 Utilitas Cambridge University Press 11/1(1999-03), 71-90 0953-8208 11:1<71 1999 11 UTI https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800002272 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800002272 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Zangwill Nick Glasgow University, nza@arts.gla.ac.uk NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Utilitas Cambridge University Press 11/1(1999-03), 71-90 0953-8208 11:1<71 1999 11 UTI CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge