caa a22 4500 388067373 CHVBK 20180307125137.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199911 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S095382080000251X doi S095382080000251X pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S095382080000251X Hanser Matthew University of California, Santa Barbara, hanser@humanitas.ucsb.edu Killing, Letting Die and Preventing People From Being Saved [Elektronische Daten] [Matthew Hanser] The distinction between killing and letting die is too simple. A third category - preventing people from being saved - must also be recognized. Like killing, preventing a person from being saved is a species of doing harm; like killing, it infringes one of the victim's negative rights. Yet preventing a person from being saved is morally on a par with letting die, which infringes one of the victim's positive rights. It follows that we cannot explain the moral inequivalence of killing and letting die by saying, as so many have, that negative rights are more stringent than positive rights. A more promising strategy is suggested at the end of the article. Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1999 Utilitas Cambridge University Press 11/3(1999-11), 277-295 0953-8208 11:3<277 1999 11 UTI https://doi.org/10.1017/S095382080000251X text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S095382080000251X text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Hanser Matthew University of California, Santa Barbara, hanser@humanitas.ucsb.edu NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Utilitas Cambridge University Press 11/3(1999-11), 277-295 0953-8208 11:3<277 1999 11 UTI CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge