caa a22 4500 388067489 CHVBK 20180307125137.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199907 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0953820800002405 doi S0953820800002405 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0953820800002405 Lenman James University of Glasgow, j.lenman@philosophy.arts.gla.ac.uk Michael Smith and the Daleks: Reason, Morality, and Contingency [Elektronische Daten] [James Lenman] Smith has defended the rationalist's conceptual claim that moral requirements are categorical requirements of reason, arguing that no status short of this would make sense of our taking these requirements as seriously as we do. Against this I argue that Smith has failed to show either that our moral commitments would be undermined by possessing only an internal, contextual justification or that they need presuppose any expectation that rational agents must converge on their acceptance. His claim that this rationalistic understanding of metaethics is required for the intelligibility of moral disagreement is also found to be inadequately supported. It is further proposed that the rationalist's substantive claims - that there are such categorical requirements of reason and that our actual moral commitments are a case in point - are liable to disappointment; and that the conceptual claim is fatally undermined by reflection on how we might best respond to such disappointment. Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1999 Utilitas Cambridge University Press 11/2(1999-07), 164-177 0953-8208 11:2<164 1999 11 UTI https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800002405 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800002405 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Lenman James University of Glasgow, j.lenman@philosophy.arts.gla.ac.uk NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Utilitas Cambridge University Press 11/2(1999-07), 164-177 0953-8208 11:2<164 1999 11 UTI CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge