caa a22 4500 388067519 CHVBK 20180307125137.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199907 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0953820800002399 doi S0953820800002399 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0953820800002399 Gilbert Margaret University of Connecticut, Storrs, gilbert@uconnvm.uconn.edu Obligation and Joint Commitment [Elektronische Daten] [Margaret Gilbert] We speak of ‘obligations' in many contexts. But what are obligations? I argue that obligations of an important type inhere in what I call ‘joint commitments'. I propose a joint commitment account of everyday agreements. This could explain why some philosophers believe that we know of the obligating nature of agreements a priori. I compare and contrast obligations of joint commitment with obligations in the relatively narrow sense recommended by H. L. A. Hart, a recommendation that has been influential. Some central contexts in which Hart takes there to be obligations in his sense are contexts in which there are obligations of joint commitment. Nonetheless different senses of ‘obligation' appear to be at issue. Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1999 Utilitas Cambridge University Press 11/2(1999-07), 143-163 0953-8208 11:2<143 1999 11 UTI https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800002399 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800002399 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Gilbert Margaret University of Connecticut, Storrs, gilbert@uconnvm.uconn.edu NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Utilitas Cambridge University Press 11/2(1999-07), 143-163 0953-8208 11:2<143 1999 11 UTI CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge