caa a22 4500 388067535 CHVBK 20180307125137.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199907 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0953820800002430 doi S0953820800002430 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0953820800002430 Barclay Linda La Trobe University, L.barclay@latrobe.edu.au Rights, intrinsic values and the politics of abortion [Elektronische Daten] [Linda Barclay] In Life's Dominion Ronald Dworkin argues that disagreement over the morality ofabortion is about how best to respect the intrinsic value of human life, rather than about foetal rights as many people mistakenly suppose. Dworkin argues that the state should be neutral indebates about intrinsic value and thus it should be neutral in the abortion debate. Through a consideration of the notion of intrinsic value, it is argued in this article that Dworkin'sargument fails. On the interpretation of ‘intrinsic value' which Dworkin seems to favour, it is shown to be implausible that such a notion accounts for different views about the value of human life. On an alternative interpretation of ‘intrinsic value' it is argued that the state is not usually neutral on such matters, and thus there is no reason why it should be in the case of abortion. Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1999 Utilitas Cambridge University Press 11/2(1999-07), 215-229 0953-8208 11:2<215 1999 11 UTI https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800002430 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800002430 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Barclay Linda La Trobe University, L.barclay@latrobe.edu.au NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Utilitas Cambridge University Press 11/2(1999-07), 215-229 0953-8208 11:2<215 1999 11 UTI CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge