caa a22 4500 388070412 CHVBK 20180307125147.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199906 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0022050700022877 doi S0022050700022877 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0022050700022877 Ramírez Carlos D. Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030, Phone (703) 993-1145, Fax (703) 993-1133. E-mail cramire2@osf1.gmu.edu. Did Glass-Steagall Increase the Cost of External Finance for Corporate Investment?: Evidence From Bank and Insurance Company Affiliations [Elektronische Daten] [Carlos D. Ramírez] The Glass-Steagall Act may have increased the cost for corporations of raising external funds for investment spending. Significant differences are found in the way financial institutions influenced corporate investment spending. Investment regressions for a sample of companies affiliated to financial institutions are estimated and compared to those for a control sample. Prior to Glass-Steagall, affiliated companies do not display any sensitivity between investment spending and internal measures of liquidity, whereas the control sample does. Copyright © The Economic History Association 1999 The Journal of Economic History Cambridge University Press 59/2(1999-06), 372-396 0022-0507 59:2<372 1999 59 JEH https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050700022877 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050700022877 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Ramírez Carlos D. Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030, Phone (703) 993-1145, Fax (703) 993-1133. E-mail cramire2@osf1.gmu.edu NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- The Journal of Economic History Cambridge University Press 59/2(1999-06), 372-396 0022-0507 59:2<372 1999 59 JEH CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge