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   <subfield code="a">In an extreme case, ... only officials might accept and use the system's criteria of legal validity. The society in which this was so might be deplorably sheeplike; and the sheep might end in the slaughter-house. But there is little reason for thinking that it could not exist or for denying it the title of a legal system. The essence of legal positivism, wrote H.L.A. Hart, is a very simple contention: &quot;[I]t is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality” (185-86). It is tempting to treat this claim—which some have called &quot;the separability thesis”—as a definitional truth about law, i.e., as a constraint on any adequate definition of the term &quot;law.” On this understanding, the positivist maintains that one should not define &quot;law&quot; in a way that excludes some norms from the extension of this term simply because they do not reproduce or satisfy a particular moral demand. Similarly, on this understanding, one should not exclude a system of norms, S, from the extension of the term &quot;legal system” on account of S's failure to satisfy the demands of justice. Indeed, positivism entails not only that one should not exclude S on this ground, but also that the injustice of S is not even a reason for regarding S as a problematic or marginal or less-than-central case of &quot;law.” The positivist holds that it is a mistake to build moral conditions into the definition of &quot;law” in any way whatsoever.</subfield>
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