caa a22 4500 388078693 CHVBK 20180307125206.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199909 xx s 000 0 eng 10.2307/2585572 doi S0003055400218169 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.2307/2585572 Binder Sarah A. The Brookings Institution and, George Washington University The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96 [Elektronische Daten] [Sarah A. Binder] David Mayhew's Divided We Govern(1991) sparked an industry of scholars who alternately challenge or confirm the work on theoretical and empirical grounds. Still, we lack a definitive account of the proportions and causes of legislative gridlock. I revisit the effects of elections and institutions on policy outcomes to propose an alternative theory of gridlock: The distribution of policy preferences within the parties, between the two chambers, and across Congress more broadly is central to explaining the dynamics of gridlock. To test the model, I construct a measure that assesses legislative output in proportion to the policy agenda. Using newspaper editorials to identify every salient legislative issue between 1947 and 1996, I generate Congress-by-Congress gridlock scores and use them to test competing explanations. The results suggest that intrabranch conflict—perhaps more than interbranch rivalry—is critical in shaping deadlock in American politics. Copyright © American Political Science Association 1999 American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 93/3(1999-09), 519-533 0003-0554 93:3<519 1999 93 PSR https://doi.org/10.2307/2585572 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2307/2585572 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Binder Sarah A. The Brookings Institution and, George Washington University NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 93/3(1999-09), 519-533 0003-0554 93:3<519 1999 93 PSR CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge