caa a22 4500 388078979 CHVBK 20180307125207.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199909 xx s 000 0 eng 10.2307/2585573 doi S0003055400218170 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.2307/2585573 Wilkerson John D. University of Washington "Killer” Amendments in Congress [Elektronische Daten] [John D. Wilkerson] For more than three decades, social choice theorists and legislative scholars have studied how legislative outcomes in Congress can be manipulated through strategic amendments and voting. I address the central limitation of this research, a virtual absence of systematic empirical work, by examining 76 "killer” amendments considered during the 103d and 104th congresses. I trace the effects of these amendments on their related bills using archival sources, test for strategic voting using NOMINATE as the baseline measure of legislator preferences across a range of issues, and explore with OLS regression why some killer amendments are more strategically important than others. The findings indicate that successful killer amendments and identifiable strategic voting are extremely rare. In none of the cases examined could the defeat of a bill be attributed to adoption of an alleged killer amendment. Copyright © American Political Science Association 1999 American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 93/3(1999-09), 535-552 0003-0554 93:3<535 1999 93 PSR https://doi.org/10.2307/2585573 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2307/2585573 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Wilkerson John D. University of Washington NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 93/3(1999-09), 535-552 0003-0554 93:3<535 1999 93 PSR CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge