caa a22 4500 388080221 CHVBK 20180307125212.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199912 xx s 000 0 eng 10.2307/2586114 doi S0003055400219102 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.2307/2586114 Morelli Massimo Iowa State University and University of Minnesota Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining [Elektronische Daten] [Massimo Morelli] I propose a new majoritarian bargaining model in which more than one implicit proposal can be on the table at the same time. Institutional differences from system to system affect the order of play, the equilibrium majorities, and the policy outcome. The ex post distribution of payoffs within a winning coalition is, however, invariant to fundamental institutional differences, and it is always proportional to the distribution of relative ex ante bargaining power. The bargaining process is modeled as a sequential demand game, in which players are called to propose a policy and to specify their desired share of the private benefits related to being in office. The order of play is endogenous, and the distribution of payoffs within an equilibrium majority usually does not depend on who is the proposal maker. The role of the head of state and the advantages to center parties are also studied. Copyright © American Political Science Association 1999 American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 93/4(1999-12), 809-820 0003-0554 93:4<809 1999 93 PSR https://doi.org/10.2307/2586114 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2307/2586114 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Morelli Massimo Iowa State University and University of Minnesota NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 93/4(1999-12), 809-820 0003-0554 93:4<809 1999 93 PSR CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge