caa a22 4500 388080590 CHVBK 20180307125213.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199912 xx s 000 0 eng 10.2307/2586113 doi S0003055400219096 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.2307/2586113 An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace [Elektronische Daten] We examine formally the link between domestic political institutions and policy choices in the context of eight empirical regularities that constitute the democratic peace. We demonstrate that democratic leaders, when faced with war, are more inclined to shift extra resources into the war effort than are autocrats. This follows because the survival of political leaders with larger winning coalitions hinges on successful policy. The extra effort made by democrats provides a military advantage over autocrats. This makes democrats unattractive targets, since their institutional constraints cause them to mobilize resources for the war effort. In addition to trying harder, democrats are more selective in their choice of targets. Because defeat is more likely to lead to domestic replacement for democrats than for autocrats, democrats only initiate wars they expect to win. These two factors lead to the interaction between polities that is often referred to as the democratic peace. Copyright © American Political Science Association 1999 de Mesquita Bruce Bueno Hoover Institution Morrow James D. Hoover Institution Siverson Randolph M. University of California, Davis Smith Alastair Yale University American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 93/4(1999-12), 791-807 0003-0554 93:4<791 1999 93 PSR https://doi.org/10.2307/2586113 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2307/2586113 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- de Mesquita Bruce Bueno Hoover Institution NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Morrow James D. Hoover Institution NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Siverson Randolph M. University of California, Davis NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Smith Alastair Yale University NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 93/4(1999-12), 791-807 0003-0554 93:4<791 1999 93 PSR CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge