caa a22 4500 388080760 CHVBK 20180307125214.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199912 xx s 000 0 eng 10.2307/2586115 doi S0003055400219114 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.2307/2586115 Coleman John J. University of Wisconsin Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness [Elektronische Daten] [John J. Coleman] Revisionist accounts conclude that divided and unified government do not differ significantly in the production of "important” public policy. I argue instead that when one theoretically reclaims the concerns about party responsiveness and institutional features of American politics that have animated party government scholars, unified government is significantly more productive than divided government. Employing a range of measures of important legislative enactments in the postwar period, I find that unified government produces greater quantities of significant enactments and is more responsive to the public mood than is divided government. The evidence suggests that parties do, as party government theorists maintain, generate incentives to cooperation that help transcend some of the policymaking gaps created by the Constitution. Copyright © American Political Science Association 1999 American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 93/4(1999-12), 821-835 0003-0554 93:4<821 1999 93 PSR https://doi.org/10.2307/2586115 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2307/2586115 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Coleman John J. University of Wisconsin NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 93/4(1999-12), 821-835 0003-0554 93:4<821 1999 93 PSR CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge