caa a22 4500 388080884 CHVBK 20180307125215.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199912 xx s 000 0 eng 10.2307/2586111 doi S0003055400219072 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.2307/2586111 Galston William A. University of Maryland Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory [Elektronische Daten] [William A. Galston] Building on suggestions by Isaiah Berlin, a number of thinkers have elaborated a moral theory of value pluralism. Berlin himself believed that value pluralism was consistent with liberalism, which he understood as a political theory giving great weight to the value of negative liberty. Theorists led by John Gray have argued, however, that Berlin's pluralist stance toward values is not consistent with his commitment to liberalism. Gray's critique has triggered a wide-ranging theoretical debate, and the purpose of this article is to assess that debate. I sketch the essentials of value pluralism and explore its implications for liberal political theory. I conclude that Gray's argument modifies our understanding of liberal democracy but does not drive a wedge between value pluralism and liberal democratic theory. Nevertheless, it underscores the importance of prudence and attention to specific circumstances when using liberal democratic norms to guide the reform of illiberal institutions. Copyright © American Political Science Association 1999 American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 93/4(1999-12), 769-778 0003-0554 93:4<769 1999 93 PSR https://doi.org/10.2307/2586111 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2307/2586111 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Galston William A. University of Maryland NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 93/4(1999-12), 769-778 0003-0554 93:4<769 1999 93 PSR CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge