caa a22 4500 388081473 CHVBK 20180307125217.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130e199906 xx s 000 0 eng 10.2307/2585396 doi S0003055400217334 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.2307/2585396 Signorino Curtis S. University of Rochester Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict [Elektronische Daten] [Curtis S. Signorino] Although strategic interaction is at the heart of most international relations theory, it has largely been missing from much empirical analysis in the field. Typical applications of logit and probit to theories of international conflict generally do not capture the structure of the strategic interdependence implied by those theories. I demonstrate how to derive statistical discrete choice models of international conflict that directly incorporate the theorized strategic interaction. I show this for a simple crisis interaction model and then use Monte Carlo analysis to show that logit provides estimates with incorrect substantive interpretations as well as fitted values that can be far from the true values. Finally, I reanalyze a well-known game-theoretic model of war, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's (1992) international interaction game. My results indicate that there is at best modest empirical support for their model. Copyright © American Political Science Association 1999 American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 93/2(1999-06), 279-297 0003-0554 93:2<279 1999 93 PSR https://doi.org/10.2307/2585396 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2307/2585396 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Signorino Curtis S. University of Rochester NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- American Political Science Review Cambridge University Press 93/2(1999-06), 279-297 0003-0554 93:2<279 1999 93 PSR CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge