caa a22 4500 388110090 CHVBK 20180307125351.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130s1999 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0265052500002284 doi S0265052500002284 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0265052500002284 Hill Thomas E. Philosophy, The University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Happiness and Human Flourishing in Kant's Ethics [Elektronische Daten] [Thomas E. Hill] Ancient moral philosophers, especially Aristotle and his followers, typically shared the assumption that ethics is primarily concerned with how to achieve the final end for human beings, a life of "happiness” or "human flourishing.” This final end was not a subjective condition, such as contentment or the satisfaction of our preferences, but a life that could be objectively determined to be appropriate to our nature as human beings. Character traits were treated as moral virtues because they contributed well toward this ideal life, either as means to it or as constitutive aspects of it. Traits that tended to prevent a "happy” life were considered vices, even if they contributed to a life that was pleasant and what a person most wanted. The idea of "happiness” (or human flourishing) was central, then, in philosophical efforts to specify what we ought to do, what sort of persons we should try to become, and what sort of life a wise person would hope for. Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1999 Social Philosophy and Policy Cambridge University Press 16/1(1999), 143-175 0265-0525 16:1<143 1999 16 SOY https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500002284 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500002284 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Hill Thomas E. Philosophy, The University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Social Philosophy and Policy Cambridge University Press 16/1(1999), 143-175 0265-0525 16:1<143 1999 16 SOY CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge