caa a22 4500 38811018X CHVBK 20180307125351.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130s1999 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0265052500002478 doi S0265052500002478 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0265052500002478 Mele Alfred R. Philosophy, Davidson College Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck [Elektronische Daten] [Alfred R. Mele] My topic lies on conceptual terrain that is quite familiar to philosophers. For others, a bit of background may be in order. In light of what has filtered down from quantum mechanics, few philosophers today believe that the universe is causally deterministic (or "deterministic,” for short). That is, to use Peter van Inwagen's succinct definition of "determinism,” few philosophers believe that "there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future.” Even so, partly for obvious historical reasons, philosophers continue to argue about whether free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism. Compatibilists argue for compatibility, and incompatibilists argue against it. Some incompatibilists maintain that free will and moral responsibility are illusions. But most are libertarians, libertarianism being the conjunction of incompatibilism and the thesis that at least some human beings are possessed of free will and moral responsibility. Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1999 Social Philosophy and Policy Cambridge University Press 16/2(1999), 274-293 0265-0525 16:2<274 1999 16 SOY https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500002478 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500002478 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Mele Alfred R. Philosophy, Davidson College NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Social Philosophy and Policy Cambridge University Press 16/2(1999), 274-293 0265-0525 16:2<274 1999 16 SOY CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge