caa a22 4500 388110236 CHVBK 20180307125351.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130s1999 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0265052500002387 doi S0265052500002387 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0265052500002387 Moore Michael S. Law and Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania Causation and Responsibility [Elektronische Daten] [Michael S. Moore] In various areas of Anglo-American law, legal liability turns on causation. In torts and contracts, we are each liable only for those harms we have caused by the actions that breach our legal duties. Such doctrines explicitly make causation an element of liability. In criminal law, sometimes the causal element for liability is equally explicit, as when a statute makes punishable any act that has "caused ... abuse to the child .” More often, the causal element in criminal liability is more implicit, as when criminal statutes prohibit killings, maimings, rapings, burnings, etc. Such causally complex action verbs are correctly applied only to defendants who have caused death, caused disfigurement, caused penetration, caused fire damage, etc. Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1999 Social Philosophy and Policy Cambridge University Press 16/2(1999), 1-51 0265-0525 16:2<1 1999 16 SOY https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500002387 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500002387 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Moore Michael S. Law and Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Social Philosophy and Policy Cambridge University Press 16/2(1999), 1-51 0265-0525 16:2<1 1999 16 SOY CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence SWISSBIB 305563203 BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge