caa a22 4500 388110252 CHVBK 20180307125351.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161130s1999 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1017/S0265052500002466 doi S0265052500002466 pii (NATIONALLICENCE)cambridge-10.1017/S0265052500002466 Meyer Susan Sauvé Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania Fate, Fatalism, and Agency in Stoicism [Elektronische Daten] [Susan Sauvé Meyer] A perennial subject of dispute in the Western philosophical tradition is whether human agents can be responsible for their actions even if determinism is true. By determinism, I mean the view that everything that happens (human actions, choices, and deliberations included) is completely determined by antecedent causes. One of the least impressive objections that is leveled against determinism confuses determinism with a very different view that has come to be known as "fatalism”: this is the view that everything is determined to happen independently of human choices, efforts, and deliberations. It is a common fallacy, among students contemplating the implications of determinism for the first time, to argue: "But if everything is determined in advance, then it doesn't matter what we decide to do; what is determined to happen will happen no matter what.” This argument fallaciously infers fatalism from determinism. Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1999 Social Philosophy and Policy Cambridge University Press 16/2(1999), 250-273 0265-0525 16:2<250 1999 16 SOY https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500002466 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500002466 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Meyer Susan Sauvé Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Social Philosophy and Policy Cambridge University Press 16/2(1999), 250-273 0265-0525 16:2<250 1999 16 SOY CC0 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-cambridge