caa a22 4500 397494750 CHVBK 20180308164518.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161202e199504 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036863 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)oxford-10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036863 Ramseyer J. Mark University of Chicago The Market for Children: Evidence from Early Modern Japan [Elektronische Daten] [J. Mark Ramseyer] Using a data set of about 1,000 Japanese contracts, I study the relationships among urban labor markets, peasant employment contracts, and parental control over work-age children From 1600 to the mid-18th century, the use of contracts for the sale, pledge, or long-term employment of a large nonagricultural labor market. Because this market (with its informal, at-will contractual terms) made it profitable for so many children to abscond, it threatened any property right that parents may once have had in their children's work. And absent that property right, most employers no longer offered long-term contracts on attractive terms. By making it profitable for dissatified children to aboscond, this new lablr market also reduced the control that parents had over their children. Indirectly to be sure, it shaped relations within the family and constrained domestic exploitation as well. © 1995 by Oxford University Press Articles nationallicence The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Oxford University Press 11/1(1995-04), 127-149 8756-6222 11:1<127 1995 11 jleorg https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036863 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036863 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Ramseyer J. Mark University of Chicago NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Oxford University Press 11/1(1995-04), 127-149 8756-6222 11:1<127 1995 11 jleorg Metadata rights reserved CC BY-NC-4.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-oxford