caa a22 4500 397497687 CHVBK 20180308164525.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161202e199501 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1093/philmat/3.1.103 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)oxford-10.1093/philmat/3.1.103 DETLEFSEN MICHAEL Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, IN 46556, U. S. A. email: detlefsen.l@nd.edu Wright on the Non-mechanizability of Intuitionist Reasoning [Elektronische Daten] [MICHAEL DETLEFSEN] In his paper ‘Intuitionists are not (Turing) Machines', Crispin Wright joins the ranks of those who have sought to refute mechanist theories of mind by invoking Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems. His predecessors include Gödel himself, J. R. Lucas and, most recently, Roger Penrose. The aim of this essay is to show that, like his predecessors, Wright, too, fails to make his case, and that, indeed, he fails to do so even when judged by standards of success which he himself lays down. © Oxford University Press Articles nationallicence Philosophia Mathematica Oxford University Press 3/1(1995-01), 103-119 0031-8019 3:1<103 1995 3 philmat https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/3.1.103 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/3.1.103 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- DETLEFSEN MICHAEL Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, IN 46556, U. S. A. email: detlefsen.l@nd.edu NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Philosophia Mathematica Oxford University Press 3/1(1995-01), 103-119 0031-8019 3:1<103 1995 3 philmat Metadata rights reserved CC BY-NC-4.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-oxford