caa a22 4500 397497725 CHVBK 20180308164525.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161202e199501 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1093/philmat/3.1.86 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)oxford-10.1093/philmat/3.1.86 WRIGHT CRISPIN Department of Logic and Metaphysics, University of St Andrews Fife KY16 9AL, Scotland Intuitionists Are Not (Turing) Machines [Elektronische Daten] [CRISPIN WRIGHT] Lucas and Penrose have contended that, by displaying how any characterisation of arithmetical proof programmable into a machine allows of diagonalisation, generating a humanly recognisable proof which eludes that characterisation, Gödel's incompleteness theorem rules out any purely mechanical model of the human intellect. The main criticisms of this argument have been that the proof generated by diagonalisation (i) will not be humanly recognisable unless humans can grasp the specification of the object-system (Benacerraf); and (ii) counts as a proof only on the (unproven) hypothesis that the object system is consistent (Putnam). The present paper argues that criticism (ii) may be met head-on by an intuitionistic proponent of the anti-mechanist argument; and that criticism (i) is simply mistaken. However the paper concludes by questioning the sufficiency of the situation for an interesting anti-mechanist conclusion. © Oxford University Press Articles nationallicence Philosophia Mathematica Oxford University Press 3/1(1995-01), 86-102 0031-8019 3:1<86 1995 3 philmat https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/3.1.86 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/3.1.86 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- WRIGHT CRISPIN Department of Logic and Metaphysics, University of St Andrews Fife KY16 9AL, Scotland NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Philosophia Mathematica Oxford University Press 3/1(1995-01), 86-102 0031-8019 3:1<86 1995 3 philmat Metadata rights reserved CC BY-NC-4.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-oxford