caa a22 4500 397497857 CHVBK 20180308164525.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161202e199505 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1093/philmat/3.2.166 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)oxford-10.1093/philmat/3.2.166 RESNIK MICHAEL Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Chapel Hill, N. C. 27599-3125, U. S. A. resnik@gibbs.oit.unc.edu Scientific vs. Mathematical Realism: The Indispensability Argument [Elektronische Daten] [MICHAEL RESNIK] Penelope Maddy and Elliott Sober recently attacked the confirmational indispensability argument for mathematical realism. We cannot count on science to provide evidence for the truth of mathematics, they say, because either scientific testing fails to confirm mathematics (Sober) or too much mathematics occurs in false scientific theories (Maddy). I present a pragmatic indispensability argument immune to these objections, and show that this argument supports mathematical realism independently of scientific realism. Mathematical realism, it turns out, may be even more firmly established than scientific realism. © Oxford University Press Articles nationallicence Philosophia Mathematica Oxford University Press 3/2(1995-05), 166-174 0031-8019 3:2<166 1995 3 philmat https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/3.2.166 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/3.2.166 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- RESNIK MICHAEL Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Chapel Hill, N. C. 27599-3125, U. S. A. resnik@gibbs.oit.unc.edu NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Philosophia Mathematica Oxford University Press 3/2(1995-05), 166-174 0031-8019 3:2<166 1995 3 philmat Metadata rights reserved CC BY-NC-4.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-oxford