caa a22 4500 397524285 CHVBK 20180308164640.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161202e199510 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a037258 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)oxford-10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a037258 Institutions Matter: Comparing Deficit Spending in the United States and Japan [Elektronische Daten] [Sung Deuk Hahm, Mark S. Kamlet, David C. Mowery] This article analyzes the post-World War II deficit experiences of the United States and Japan. Four potential explanations of the size of the central government deficit in these two countries are examined: the influence of the economy; the influence of the party in power; Roubini and Sachs's (1989a and 1989b) strength-of-government hypothesis; and the irresponsible Congress/responsible president hypothesis (relevant only to the United States). As expected, we find that in both countries the state of the economy has an important influence on the deficit. Controlling for the economy, we find stronger support for the strength-of-government hypothesis for Japan than Roubini and Sachs found. In the United States, however, we find no support for the party-in-power, the strength-of-government, or the irresponsible Congress/responsible president hypotheses. Indeed, these latter two hypotheses are contradicted by evidence that when the president has strong political and popular support, as measured by his control of Congress and the state of the economy, the U.S. deficit appears to increase by more than would otherwise be the case. The contrasting empirical results for the United States and Japan reflect the distinctive structural and institutional features of the U.S. presidential and Japanese parliamentary systems, the impact of these features on the incentives of the relevant political actors, and the influence of these incentives on the policy outcomes. © 1995 by The Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Inc. ARTICLES nationallicence Hahm Sung Deuk Georgetown University aut Kamlet Mark S. Carnegie-Mellon University aut Mowery David C. University of California Berkeley aut Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory Oxford University Press 5/4(1995-10), 429-450 1053-1858 5:4<429 1995 5 jopart https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a037258 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a037258 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Hahm Sung Deuk Georgetown University aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Kamlet Mark S. Carnegie-Mellon University aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Mowery David C. University of California Berkeley aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory Oxford University Press 5/4(1995-10), 429-450 1053-1858 5:4<429 1995 5 jopart Metadata rights reserved CC BY-NC-4.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-oxford