caa a22 4500 397544642 CHVBK 20180308164735.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161202e199601 xx s 000 0 eng 10.2307/2298112 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)oxford-10.2307/2298112 Tirole Jean Institut d'Economie Industrielle, Toulouse, Paris A Theory of Collective Reputations (with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality) [Elektronische Daten] [Jean Tirole] The paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations. A member's current incentives are affected by his past behaviour and, because his track record is observed only with noise, by the group's past behaviour as well. The paper thus studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature. It shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone, and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt. Last, the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality. © 1996 The Review of Economic Studies Limited The Review of Economic Studies Wiley-Blackwell 63/1(1996-01), 1-22 0034-6527 63:1<1 1996 63 restud https://doi.org/10.2307/2298112 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2307/2298112 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Tirole Jean Institut d'Economie Industrielle, Toulouse, Paris NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- The Review of Economic Studies Wiley-Blackwell 63/1(1996-01), 1-22 0034-6527 63:1<1 1996 63 restud Metadata rights reserved CC BY-NC-4.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-oxford