caa a22 4500 397544677 CHVBK 20180308164736.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161202e199604 xx s 000 0 eng 10.2307/2297855 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)oxford-10.2307/2297855 Schultz Christian Institute of Economics Polarization and Inefficient Policies [Elektronische Daten] [Christian Schultz] Two parties have different goals. Voters, but not parties, are uncertain about the functioning of the economy, in this case the costs of producing a public good. The parties each propose a policy, an election is held and the policy of the winning party is implemented. Voters and parties care about the level of the public good and costs. Two kinds of sequential equilibria exist; revealing, where voters learn the true costs and the implemented policy adjusts to costs, and non-revealing. If parties' preferences are polarized only non-revealing equilibria fulfill a refinement criterion like the intuitive criterion. If they are alike only revealing equilibria fulfill this criterion. Thus less political polarization improves information revelation. © 1996 The Review of Economic Studies Limited The Review of Economic Studies Wiley-Blackwell 63/2(1996-04), 331-344 0034-6527 63:2<331 1996 63 restud https://doi.org/10.2307/2297855 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2307/2297855 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Schultz Christian Institute of Economics NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- The Review of Economic Studies Wiley-Blackwell 63/2(1996-04), 331-344 0034-6527 63:2<331 1996 63 restud Metadata rights reserved CC BY-NC-4.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-oxford