caa a22 4500 397544707 CHVBK 20180308164736.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161202e199601 xx s 000 0 eng 10.2307/2298113 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)oxford-10.2307/2298113 A Characterization of Game-Theoretic Solutions Which Lead to Impossibility Theorems [Elektronische Daten] For some game-theoretic solution concepts, such as dominant strategies, Nash equilibrium, and undominated strategies, only dictatorial social choice functions are implementable on a full domain of preferences with at least three alternatives. For other solution concepts, such as the iterative removal of weakly dominated strategies, undominated Nash equilibrium, and maximin, it is possible to implement non-dictatorial social choice functions. Which aspects of solution concepts accounts for these differences? We answer this question by providing a characterization of solution concepts which lead to impossibility results. © 1996 The Review of Economic Studies Limited Jackson Matthew O. Northwestern University Srivastava Sanjay Carnegie Mellon University The Review of Economic Studies Wiley-Blackwell 63/1(1996-01), 23-38 0034-6527 63:1<23 1996 63 restud https://doi.org/10.2307/2298113 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2307/2298113 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Jackson Matthew O. Northwestern University NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Srivastava Sanjay Carnegie Mellon University NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- The Review of Economic Studies Wiley-Blackwell 63/1(1996-01), 23-38 0034-6527 63:1<23 1996 63 restud Metadata rights reserved CC BY-NC-4.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-oxford