caa a22 4500 397544804 CHVBK 20180308164736.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161202e199610 xx s 000 0 eng 10.2307/2297795 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)oxford-10.2307/2297795 Kocherlakota Narayana R. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment [Elektronische Daten] [Narayana R. Kocherlakota] Consumption data generally indicates that consumption risk is not perfectly diversified across individuals. This paper considers if and when imperfect diversification is a feature of efficient allocations in a symmetric information environment without commitment. It shows that if individuals are sufficiently patient, imperfect diversification is always sub-optimal in the long run; however, if individuals are not so patient, imperfect diversification is always optimal. The paper goes on to demonstrate that the way that history matters in an efficient allocation in a symmetric-information/no-commitment environment can be used to distinguish lack of commitment from other possible rationalizations of imperfect risk sharing, such as efficiency in the presence of asymmetric information. © 1996 The Review of Economic Studies Limited The Review of Economic Studies Wiley-Blackwell 63/4(1996-10), 595-609 0034-6527 63:4<595 1996 63 restud https://doi.org/10.2307/2297795 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2307/2297795 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Kocherlakota Narayana R. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- The Review of Economic Studies Wiley-Blackwell 63/4(1996-10), 595-609 0034-6527 63:4<595 1996 63 restud Metadata rights reserved CC BY-NC-4.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-oxford