caa a22 4500 397544855 CHVBK 20180308164736.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161202e199604 xx s 000 0 eng 10.2307/2297853 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)oxford-10.2307/2297853 Rahi Rohit Birkbeck College Adverse Selection and Security Design [Elektronische Daten] [Rohit Rahi] This paper studies the problem of optimal security design by a privately informed entrepreneur. In the context of a simple parametric model, it is shown that the entrepreneur does not find it profitable to float an asset that affords her an informational advantage. The reason is that, with rational, uninformed outside investors, the entrepreneur faces adverse selection in the security market, which prevents her from exploiting her position as an insider. This is true whether or not she has market power in trading the asset. © 1996 The Review of Economic Studies Limited The Review of Economic Studies Wiley-Blackwell 63/2(1996-04), 287-300 0034-6527 63:2<287 1996 63 restud https://doi.org/10.2307/2297853 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2307/2297853 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Rahi Rohit Birkbeck College NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- The Review of Economic Studies Wiley-Blackwell 63/2(1996-04), 287-300 0034-6527 63:2<287 1996 63 restud Metadata rights reserved CC BY-NC-4.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-oxford