caa a22 4500 397544863 CHVBK 20180915123716.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161202e199604 xx s 000 0 eng 10.2307/2297852 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)oxford-10.2307/2297852 Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics [Elektronische Daten] [Gene M. Grossman, Elhanan Helpman] We study the competition between two political parties for seats in a legislature. The parties have fixed positions on some issues, but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions. In this context, we examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving, and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms. We show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of special interest groups. The party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests. © 1996 The Review of Economic Studies Limited Grossman Gene M. Princeton University aut Helpman Elhanan Tel Aviv University and CIAR aut The Review of Economic Studies Wiley-Blackwell 63/2(1996-04), 265-286 0034-6527 63:2<265 1996 63 restud https://doi.org/10.2307/2297852 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.2307/2297852 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Grossman Gene M. Princeton University aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Helpman Elhanan Tel Aviv University and CIAR aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- The Review of Economic Studies Wiley-Blackwell 63/2(1996-04), 265-286 0034-6527 63:2<265 1996 63 restud Metadata rights reserved CC BY-NC-4.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 nationallicence SWISSBIB 091982758 BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-oxford