caa a22 4500 397549334 CHVBK 20180308164746.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161202e199607 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1093/mind/105.419.467 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)oxford-10.1093/mind/105.419.467 Price H. School of Philosophy, University of Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia. Email: Huw.Price@philosophy.su.edu.au Discussion. Backward causation and the direction of causal processes: reply to Dowe [Elektronische Daten] [H Price] Dowe (1996) argues that the success of the backward causation hypothesis in quantum mechanics would provide strong support for a version of Reichenbach's account of the direction of causal processes, which takes the direction of causation to rest on the fork asymmetry. He also criticises my perspectival account of the direction of causation, which takes causal asymmetry to be a projection of our own temporal asymmetry as agents. In this reply I take issue with Dowe's argument at three main points: his claim that the backward causation hypothesis in QM is incompatible with my perspectival approach to the direction of causation; his defence of the fork asymmetry approach against a general criticism of mine based on the time-symmetry of microphysics; and his application of his preferred account of the direction of causal processes to the relevant cases in QM. Copyright 1996 Mind Oxford University Press 105/419(1996-07), 467-474 0026-4423 105:419<467 1996 105 mind https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/105.419.467 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/105.419.467 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Price H. School of Philosophy, University of Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia. Email: Huw.Price@philosophy.su.edu.au NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Mind Oxford University Press 105/419(1996-07), 467-474 0026-4423 105:419<467 1996 105 mind Metadata rights reserved CC BY-NC-4.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-oxford