caa a22 4500 397549407 CHVBK 20180308164746.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161202e199607 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1093/mind/105.419.451 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)oxford-10.1093/mind/105.419.451 Travis C. Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling, Stirling FK9 4LA, UK. Email: ct2@stirling.ac.uk Meaning's role in truth [Elektronische Daten] [C Travis] What words mean plays a role in determining when they would be true; but not an exhaustive one. For that role leaves room for variation in truth conditions, with meanings fixed, from one speaking of words to another. What role meaning plays depends on what truth is; on what words, by virtue of meaning what they do are requied to have done (as spoken) in order to have said what is true. There is a deflationist position on what truth is: the notion is exhausted by a given, specified, mass of 'platitudes', each to the effect that if words said (say) things to be thus, things must be that way. (The thought that thus-and-so is true iff thus-and-so.) These platitudes, and so deflationism, miss that aspect of truth that determines meaning's role. Truth requires words to have the uses which, given what they mean, they should have in the circumstances of their speaking. Through this link with use, when words would be true is a factor fixing what it is they said. Copyright 1996 Mind Oxford University Press 105/419(1996-07), 451-466 0026-4423 105:419<451 1996 105 mind https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/105.419.451 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/105.419.451 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Travis C. Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling, Stirling FK9 4LA, UK. Email: ct2@stirling.ac.uk NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Mind Oxford University Press 105/419(1996-07), 451-466 0026-4423 105:419<451 1996 105 mind Metadata rights reserved CC BY-NC-4.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-oxford