caa a22 4500 39755916X CHVBK 20180308164811.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161202e199609 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1093/wber/10.3.451 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)oxford-10.1093/wber/10.3.451 Why and When Do Governments Initiate Public Enterprise Reform? [Elektronische Daten] [Jose Edgardo Campos, Hadi Salehi Esfahani] Initiating public enterprise reform is a complex decision influenced by economic factors as well as the ideological biases and personalities of political leaders. Nevertheless, the use of a contracting framework yields important generalizations about what drives the decision. This article argues that the decision depends fundamentally on the potential efficiency gains from the reform and its associated transactions costs. Costs arise because of asymmetries in information and opportunism, problems that usually plague contract negotiations. The article identifies observable variables that may affect either the potential gains or the transactions costs, uses them to construct a simple probit decision-making model, and tests the model using data from fifteen developing countries over a twenty-year period. © 1996 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / THE WORLD BANK Articles nationallicence Campos Jose Edgardo aut Esfahani Hadi Salehi aut The World Bank Economic Review Oxford University Press 10/3(1996-09), 451-485 0258-6770 10:3<451 1996 10 wber https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/10.3.451 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/10.3.451 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Campos Jose Edgardo aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Esfahani Hadi Salehi aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- The World Bank Economic Review Oxford University Press 10/3(1996-09), 451-485 0258-6770 10:3<451 1996 10 wber Metadata rights reserved CC BY-NC-4.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-oxford