caa a22 4500 397559364 CHVBK 20180308164812.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161202e199606 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1093/oxfordjournals.jae.a020902 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)oxford-10.1093/oxfordjournals.jae.a020902 Growth and Rent Dissipation: the Case of Kenya [Elektronische Daten] [Arne Bigsten, Karl Ove Moene] Poor growth performance in Kenya is rooted in the ruling elite's coalition-building to stay in power. To obtain loyal followers the public sector is over-manned. Dishonesty and rule-bending are allowed to develop within an administrative culture where politicians and top bureaucrats acquire private businesses and landholdings (straddling). Thus politics become coupled with corruption and particularistic business interests. We outline a stylized endogenous growth model to structure the discussion of why public sector surplus labour, corruption and straddling may be so harmful to economic growth in Kenya. © Centre for the Study of African Economies Articles nationallicence Bigsten Arne Gothenburg School of Economics and University of Oslo aut Moene Karl Ove Gothenburg School of Economics and University of Oslo aut Journal of African Economies Oxford University Press 5/2(1996-06), 177-198 0963-8024 5:2<177 1996 5 jafeco https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jae.a020902 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jae.a020902 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Bigsten Arne Gothenburg School of Economics and University of Oslo aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Moene Karl Ove Gothenburg School of Economics and University of Oslo aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Journal of African Economies Oxford University Press 5/2(1996-06), 177-198 0963-8024 5:2<177 1996 5 jafeco Metadata rights reserved CC BY-NC-4.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-oxford