caa a22 4500 397559445 CHVBK 20180308164812.0 cr unu---uuuuu 161202e199610 xx s 000 0 eng 10.1093/oxfordjournals.jae.a020911 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)oxford-10.1093/oxfordjournals.jae.a020911 Fielding David University of Nottingham Asymmetries in the Behaviour of Members of a Monetary Union: a Game-Theoretic Model with an Application to West Africa [Elektronische Daten] [David Fielding] Using a game-theoretic model, this paper explores the positive and normative economics of government policy choices in a monetary union. If individual governments have control over fiscal policy, then the non-cooperative solution to the model is not Pareto optimal. Moreover, the distribution of welfare typically favours largest members of the union. These results are compared with the experience of the West African Monetary Union, which exhibits many of the stylised facts predicted by the model. © Centre for the Study of African Economies Articles nationallicence Journal of African Economies Oxford University Press 5/3(1996-10), 343-365 0963-8024 5:3<343 1996 5 jafeco https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jae.a020911 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jae.a020911 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Fielding David University of Nottingham NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Journal of African Economies Oxford University Press 5/3(1996-10), 343-365 0963-8024 5:3<343 1996 5 jafeco Metadata rights reserved CC BY-NC-4.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-oxford