caa a22 4500 445359323 CHVBK 20180317142910.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170323e20110901xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10892-010-9089-4 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10892-010-9089-4 Pettigrove Glen Department of Philosophy, University of Auckland, 18 Symonds Street, Private Bag 92019, 1142, Auckland, New Zealand aut Is Virtue Ethics Self-Effacing? [Elektronische Daten] [Glen Pettigrove] Thomas Hurka, Simon Keller, and Julia Annas have recently argued that virtue ethics is self-effacing. I contend that these arguments are rooted in a mistaken understanding of the role that ideal agency and agent flourishing (should) play in virtue ethics. I then show how a virtue ethical theory can avoid the charge of self-effacement and why it is important that it do so. Springer Science+Business Media B.V., 2010 Justification nationallicence Normative ethics nationallicence Self-effacement nationallicence Virtue ethics nationallicence The Journal of Ethics Springer Netherlands 15/3(2011-09-01), 191-207 1382-4554 15:3<191 2011 15 10892 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-010-9089-4 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-010-9089-4 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Pettigrove Glen Department of Philosophy, University of Auckland, 18 Symonds Street, Private Bag 92019, 1142, Auckland, New Zealand aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- The Journal of Ethics Springer Netherlands 15/3(2011-09-01), 191-207 1382-4554 15:3<191 2011 15 10892 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer