caa a22 4500 445829524 CHVBK 20180317145309.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170323e20110801xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10657-010-9167-x doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10657-010-9167-x Detecting illegal activities: the case of cartels [Elektronische Daten] [Korbinian von Blanckenburg, Alexander Geist] This paper considers enhancements of a comparatively new method to detect cartels, the System of Cartel Markers (SCM), introduced by Blanckenburg and Geist (Int Adv Econ Res 15(4):421-436, 2009). The aim of SCM is to find illegal collusion on legal markets with observable market data. It uses expected behavior patterns such as low level of capacity utilization, slackness of price adjustments to exogenous shocks, excess rates of return, nearly constant capacities, less price changes and lower variance of capacity growth rate. However, the testing of cost efficiency is lacking so far. Following Leibenstein's (Am Econ Rev 56:392-415, 1966) X-inefficiency theory, we assume that cartel members face lower competition and hence, tend to be less cost efficient. Therefore, we enhance SCM and use cost efficiency as a further marker in order to detect cartels. We apply SCM to the German cement cartel and find empirical support for some markers. The proposed methodology may be used for antitrust screening and regulatory purposes. Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, 2010 Competition policy nationallicence Workability of markets nationallicence Industry studies nationallicence Cartel detection nationallicence von Blanckenburg Korbinian German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), Berlin, Germany aut Geist Alexander Institute of Public Economics, University of Münster, Münster, Germany aut European Journal of Law and Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 32/1(2011-08-01), 15-33 0929-1261 32:1<15 2011 32 10657 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-010-9167-x text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-010-9167-x text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- von Blanckenburg Korbinian German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), Berlin, Germany aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Geist Alexander Institute of Public Economics, University of Münster, Münster, Germany aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- European Journal of Law and Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 32/1(2011-08-01), 15-33 0929-1261 32:1<15 2011 32 10657 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer