caa a22 4500 445829621 CHVBK 20180317145309.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170323e20111201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10657-009-9139-1 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10657-009-9139-1 The right of withdrawal in the treaty of Lisbon: a game theoretic reflection on different decision processes in the EU [Elektronische Daten] [Susanne Lechner, Renate Ohr] The ways of decision-making within the EU have significantly changed in the last decades: The rule of unanimity has been more and more substituted by majority voting in order to speed up decision-making processes in a Union of 27 heterogeneous member states. A third possibility is now offered by the Lisbon Treaty including a constitutional right of withdrawal. A member state encountering a loss in its benefits caused by a decision made by majority voting may now demand compensating transfers by using the right of withdrawal. It might threaten to leave the EU if the compensation is denied. Hence, does this mean that member states now have regained a negotiation power comparable to the right to veto? Using a game theoretic approach we investigate the amount of compensating transfers to be offered under majority decisions with exit option compared to decisions requiring unanimity. The Author(s), 2010 European integration nationallicence EU decision-making nationallicence Right of withdrawal nationallicence Exit option nationallicence Game theory nationallicence Lechner Susanne Faculty of Economic Science, University of Goettingen, Platz der Goettinger Sieben 3, 37073, Goettingen, Germany aut Ohr Renate Faculty of Economic Science, University of Goettingen, Platz der Goettinger Sieben 3, 37073, Goettingen, Germany aut European Journal of Law and Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 32/3(2011-12-01), 357-375 0929-1261 32:3<357 2011 32 10657 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-009-9139-1 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-009-9139-1 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Lechner Susanne Faculty of Economic Science, University of Goettingen, Platz der Goettinger Sieben 3, 37073, Goettingen, Germany aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Ohr Renate Faculty of Economic Science, University of Goettingen, Platz der Goettinger Sieben 3, 37073, Goettingen, Germany aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- European Journal of Law and Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 32/3(2011-12-01), 357-375 0929-1261 32:3<357 2011 32 10657 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer