caa a22 4500 445829648 CHVBK 20180317145309.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170323e20111001xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10657-011-9237-8 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10657-011-9237-8 Informational externalities and settlements in mass tort litigations [Elektronische Daten] [Bruno Deffains, Eric Langlais] This paper elaborates on a basic model of mass tort litigation, highlighting the existence of positive informational externalities afforded by the discovery process (as a general technology of production of evidences) in order to study when a class action is formed, or when a sequence of individual trials is more likely. We illustrate the argument that when several plaintiffs file individually a lawsuit against the same tortfeasor, the resolution of the various cases through repeated trials produces positive informational externalities. When class actions are forbidden, these externalities only benefit to the later plaintiffs (through precedents, jurisprudence...). When they are allowed, the first filer may have an incentive to initiate a class action as far as it enables him to benefit from these externalities, through the sharing of information with later filers. We provide sufficient conditions under which a class action is formed, assuming a perfect discovery process. We also show that when contingent fees are used to reward attorneys' services, plaintiffs become neutral to the arrival of new information on their case. Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, 2011 Mass tort class action nationallicence Information sharing nationallicence Repeated litigation nationallicence Contingent fees nationallicence Deffains Bruno University Panthéon-Assas, Paris II, ERMES EAC 4441 CNRS, 26 rue des Fossés Saint-Jacques, 75005, Paris, France aut Langlais Eric EconomiX, CNRS-Paris Ouest University, and LEF-INRA-AgroParisTech Nancy, 200 Avenue de la République, 92001, Nanterre Cedex, France aut European Journal of Law and Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 32/2(2011-10-01), 241-262 0929-1261 32:2<241 2011 32 10657 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-011-9237-8 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-011-9237-8 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Deffains Bruno University Panthéon-Assas, Paris II, ERMES EAC 4441 CNRS, 26 rue des Fossés Saint-Jacques, 75005, Paris, France aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Langlais Eric EconomiX, CNRS-Paris Ouest University, and LEF-INRA-AgroParisTech Nancy, 200 Avenue de la République, 92001, Nanterre Cedex, France aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- European Journal of Law and Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 32/2(2011-10-01), 241-262 0929-1261 32:2<241 2011 32 10657 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer