caa a22 4500 445829680 CHVBK 20180317145310.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170323e20111001xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10657-011-9254-7 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10657-011-9254-7 The simple economics of class action: private provision of club and public goods [Elektronische Daten] [Alberto Cassone, Giovanni Ramello] This article uses economic categories to show how the reorganisation of civil procedure in the case of class action is not merely aimed at providing a more efficient litigation technology, as hierarchies (and company law) might do for other productive activities, but that it also serves to create a well defined economic organization ultimately aimed at producing a set of goods, first and foremost among which are justice and efficiency. Class action has the potential to recreate, in the judicial domain, the same effects that individual interests and motivations, governed by the perfect competition paradigm, bring to the market. Moreover, through economic analysis it is possible to rediscover not only the productive function of this legal machinery, but also that partial compensation of victims and large profits for the class counsel, far from being a side-effect, are actually a necessary condition for reallocation of the costs and risks associated with the legal action. Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, 2011 Class action nationallicence Collective litigation nationallicence Mass tort nationallicence Club nationallicence Liability nationallicence Deterrence nationallicence Cassone Alberto Department of Public Policy and Public Choice, POLIS, Universita's del Piemonte Orientale, Via Cavour, 84, 15100, Alessandria, Italy aut Ramello Giovanni Department of Public Policy and Public Choice, POLIS, Universita's del Piemonte Orientale, Via Cavour, 84, 15100, Alessandria, Italy aut European Journal of Law and Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 32/2(2011-10-01), 205-224 0929-1261 32:2<205 2011 32 10657 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-011-9254-7 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-011-9254-7 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Cassone Alberto Department of Public Policy and Public Choice, POLIS, Universita's del Piemonte Orientale, Via Cavour, 84, 15100, Alessandria, Italy aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Ramello Giovanni Department of Public Policy and Public Choice, POLIS, Universita's del Piemonte Orientale, Via Cavour, 84, 15100, Alessandria, Italy aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- European Journal of Law and Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 32/2(2011-10-01), 205-224 0929-1261 32:2<205 2011 32 10657 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer