caa a22 4500 445829729 CHVBK 20180317145310.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170323e20111001xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10657-011-9242-y doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10657-011-9242-y Seeking rents through class actions and legislative lobbying: a comparison [Elektronische Daten] [Sophie Harnay, Alain Marciano] This article analyzes class actions as a technology that groups may use in their rent-seeking activity, in addition to other rent-seeking methods such as legislative investment within the political market, when they seek to achieve favorable decisions from decision-makers—courts and legislators. It claims that groups may make their choice between various rent-seeking technologies according to their sensitivity to the problem of free riding. Therefore, it analyzes the effect of the legal instruments that facilitate class action lawsuits and collective litigation in most countries upon the rent-seeking strategies of groups, as compared to rent-seeking through legislation. Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, 2011 Class action nationallicence Collective litigation nationallicence Rent-seeking nationallicence Free rider problem nationallicence Political market nationallicence Harnay Sophie Université Paris Ouest, Nanterre La Défense, EconomiX, CNRS UMR 7235, 200, Avenue de la République, 92001, Nanterre cedex, France aut Marciano Alain Université de Montpellier 1, Faculté d'Economie and LAMETA UMR 5474, Avenue Raymond Dugrand, CS 79606, 34960, Montpellier cedex 2, France aut European Journal of Law and Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 32/2(2011-10-01), 293-304 0929-1261 32:2<293 2011 32 10657 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-011-9242-y text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-011-9242-y text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Harnay Sophie Université Paris Ouest, Nanterre La Défense, EconomiX, CNRS UMR 7235, 200, Avenue de la République, 92001, Nanterre cedex, France aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Marciano Alain Université de Montpellier 1, Faculté d'Economie and LAMETA UMR 5474, Avenue Raymond Dugrand, CS 79606, 34960, Montpellier cedex 2, France aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- European Journal of Law and Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 32/2(2011-10-01), 293-304 0929-1261 32:2<293 2011 32 10657 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer